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ARCHITECTURAL EXPRESSION: POLICE POWER
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ANNETTE B. KOLIS*
Until recently, states could not legitimately utilize their police
power to regulate uses of land or structures for aesthetic purposes.'
In this century, however, increased industrialization and population
have compelled courts to broaden the concept of "general welfare" 2
* B.A., Knox College, 1975; J.D. Washington University, 1978.
1. See, e.g., Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Advertising & Sign Painting Co., 72
N.J.L. 285, 297, 62 A. 267, 268 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905) ("Aesthetic considerations are a
matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is necessity alone
which justifies the exercise of the police power to take private property without com-
pensation."); City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661, 148
N.E. 842, 844 (1925) (public necessity justifies the exercise of police power and for this
reason mere aesthetic considerations are insufficient to justify the exercise of police
power).
2. Police power may be exercised only for public, rather than for private purposes.
See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) ("subject only to constitutional
restraint the private right must yield to the public need"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (zoning regulations "must find their justification
in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare"); Chicago B. & 0.
Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (the validity of a police power
ordinance depends upon whether it is "really designed to accomplish a legitimate
public purpose"); City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661,
148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925) (police power is based on public necessity). See also Sayre,
Aesthetics and Proper!,' Values, Does Zoning Promote Public Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J.
471, 472 (1949) (zoning that increases the total wealth of the community is legitimate,
but zoning that promotes the advantage of the individual owner is not). Seegenerally
Comment, Aesthetic Zoning, The Right to Travel, and Growth Restrictive Ordinances,
61 IOWA L. REV. 602, 609 (1975) (if the police power is used to regulate that which
affects the "general welfare," focus must shift to defining that term).
One view asserts, however, that zoning is no longer based on public welfare.
Rather, it is "a contest between competing private interests in real estate: the devel-
oper versus the protesting property owners or neighbors," which frequently results in
.'outrageous municipal practices that discourage or prevent development." Babcock
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for which the police power may be invoked.3 States may now take a
more intrusive role in the private use and development of land.4
Municipal regulation of billboards, historical districts, and archi-
tectural design is frequently justified by primarily aesthetic pur-
poses.5 To a society whose interests in historical and natural resource
& Feurer, Land as a Commodity "'Affected with a Public Interest," 52 WASH. L. REV.
289, 291, 300 (1977).
3. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926)
("[w]ith the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed.
and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional
restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communi-
ties."); State ex re[ Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Mo. 1970) ("In this
time of burgeoning urban areas . . . it is certainly within keeping with the ultimate
ideal of general welfare that the Architectural Board . . .preserve and protect ex-
isting areas in which structures of general conformity of architecture have been er-
ected."); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 299, 150 N.E. 120, 123 (1925) (changing
economic conditions may make necessary or beneficial the right of public regulation).
4. See generally Babcock & Feurer, Land as a Commodity "Affected with a Public
Interest," 52 WASH. L. REV. 289, 299 (1977) ("The host of land use and environmen-
tal controls implemented and administered by all levels of government do affect the
use to which particular land may be put and how that use may be carried out.");
Parker, Comprehensive Design Zones.- Using Zoning to Protect the Environment, ENVI-
RONMENTAL COMMENT, January 1977, at 20 (Maryland county's enactment of a
"comprehensive design zone" designed to "follow and monitor the development proc-
ess from initial zoning to actual construction" in order to accommodate public and
private rights).
5. See Department of Hwys. v. National Adv. Co., 356 So.2d 551, 567 (La. App.
1978) ("The fact that aesthetic values are promoted in conjunction with the further-
ance of safety of travel on the public ways does not indicate an abuse of the police
power."); Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 717
(Mass. 1975) (billboard regulation under the police power upheld if solely for aes-
thetic reasons); Piscitelli v. Township Comm., 103 N.J. Super. 589, 597-98, 248 A.2d
274, 278 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1968) (ordinance designed to conserve property values
while accounting for aesthetic considerations upheld); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d
462,467, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734,738 (1963), appeal dismissedsubnom.
Storer v. New York, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (legislation promoting aesthetics is a valid
exercise of police power); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 49, 400 P.2d 255, 262
(1965) (aesthetic considerations alone may warrant exercise of police power); State ex
re. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 271, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (zoning power legitimate even for purely
aesthetic reasons). See also Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder. Aesthetics and
Objectivity, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438, 1440 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MICHIGAN Note]
(14 jurisdictions have validated ordinances based solely on aesthetic considerations;
23 require a supplemental non-aesthetic purpose; 14 have not determined the status of
aesthetic regulation); Note, Aesthetic Zoning, I 1 URBAN L. ANN. 295, 299 (1976) (the
majority rule today is that legislation to promote aesthetic considerations must be
buttressed by a non-aesthetic purpose in order to be held valid). See generally U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
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preservation have been awakened in recent years,6 billboard regula-
tion and historical district preservation appear legitimate. By con-
trast, architectural design regulations, authorizing the architectural
review of new structures for conformity7 or similarity' in designated
neighborhoods, are not based on such traditional societal values.9
Yet design review ordinances are increasingly used by municipalities
IN THE BUILDING REGULATORY PROCESS 137, 146 (1977) (42.4% of responding mu-
nicipalities with populations over 25,000 who engage in architectural design regulate
"beauty for beauty's sake").
6. Federal legislation reflects the public interest in promoting and maintaining the
natural environment. For example, in 1968, the Federal-Aid Highways Act, 23
U.S.C. § 138, and in 1966, the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1653(P). were passed, both with the purpose of maintaining natural scenery sur-
rounding our highways.
See generalh Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709,
721 (Mass. 1975) (public interest in billboard regulation); Babcock & Feurer, Land as
a Commodit, "'Affected with a Public Interest," 52 WASH. L. REV. 289, 289 (1977)
(public interest in allocating land uses); Note, Aesthetic Nuisance: An Emerging Cause
of Action, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1970) (public awareness of environmental
quality).
Courts generally uphold historic zoning legislation. See, e.g., M & N Enterprises,
Inc. v. City of Springfield, 111 111. App. 2d 444, 250 N.E.2d 289 (Ill. App. 1969) (de-
nial of rezoning in area near historical district); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964) (validity of ordinance requiring conformity with
local historical architecture).
7. See, e.g., State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Mo. 1970)
(ordinance required that a proposed structure "conform to minimum architectural
standards of appearance and conformity with surrounding structures"); Hankins v.
Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 134, 150 A.2d 63, 64 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1959) (ordinance required new dwellings to "be of early American, or of other archi-
tectural style conforming with the existing residential structure and with the rural
surroundings in the Borough"); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App.
67, 68, 192 N.E.2d 74, 75 (Ct. App. 1963) (ordinance required that proposed structure
"conform to the character of the homes in the area"); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe,
216 Va. 128, 145, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (1975) (ordinance insured that new structures
were of "good taste, proper proportion, in general and reasonable harmony with the
existing buildings in the surrounding area").
8. See, e.g., Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia Fields, 104 IIl. App. 2d
218, 219, 244 N.E.2d 369, 370 (App. Ct. 1968) (ordinance prohibited "excessive simi-
larity, dissimilarity or inappropriateness in exterior design"); D. MANDELKER, MAN-
A GING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 920 (2nd ed. 1971) (quoting the Lake Forest,
Illinois, Architectural Control Ordinance which "governs both similarity and dissimi-
larity in design").
9. See U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, NAT'L BUREAU OF STANDARDS, RESEARCH
AND INNOVATION IN THE BUILDING REGULATORY PROCESS 146 (1977). This study
concludes that polled municipalities deem historical design review to be more effec-
tive than architectural design review of new structures. The article notes that one
reason for this conclusion may be a perception on the part of municipal officials that
19791
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as supplemental "urban land-use guidance tool[s]."' These ordi-
nances typically preclude the construction of residential or commer-
cial buildings where an architectural review board determines that
the proposed structure represents an unauthorized departure from ei-
ther neighboring architectural style or local design standards. For
example, under such an ordinance, a review board might prohibit
construction of contemporary architecture in an Edwardian-style
subdivision, or promote architectural conformity in buildings located
in a city's business area.
Municipalities generally justify ordinances restricting architectural
design by showing that the ordinances preserve market values" or
maintain community character.12 Such programs fail, however, to
"historic-cultural goals ... [are] on a sounder legal footing ...[and also have
greater] political support . . ." than "beauty" or "esthetic" goals. Id
10. Id at 138. Proponents of architectural design review ordinances claim that
such regulations "enhance creative design and optimize the possibility of achieving
public as well as private sector goals." Id
11. See, e.g., State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 306-07 (Mo.
1970) (proposed dwelling validly excluded by architectural board where home would
adversely affect market values of surrounding property); Piscitelli v. Township
Comm., 103 N.J. Super. 589, 597-98, 248 A.2d 274, 278 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1968)
(ordinance designed primarily to conserve property values may also encompass aes-
thetic considerations); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 68-69,
192 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ct. App. 1963) (ordinance protecting property values by regulating
architectural design upheld). But see Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia
Fields, 104 Ill. App. 2d 218, 220, 244 N.E.2d 369, 370 (1968) (ordinance prohibiting
structures which would adversely affect the value of surrounding property held un-
constitutional for lack of adequate standards); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va.
128, 145-46, 216 S.E.2d 199, 212-213 (1975) (county regulation of architectural design
to protect property values held not authorized by enabling statutes). See generally
Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 26, 44 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Anderson] (an ordinance with the stated purpose of protecting property val-
ues through architectural control will provide "a hedge against judicial disapproval");
Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
199 (1955) ("Governmental regulation of economic activity and programs for eco-
nomic and social betterment" are likely to withstand Constitutional challenge);
Michelman, Toward a Practical Standardfor Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRAC. LAW. 36,
42 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Michelman] (author suggests that controls based on the
close association of aesthetics and economics are more open to objective judicial ex-
amination than are controls based on purely aesthetic grounds); Steinbach, Aesthetic
Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial Decisional Process, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176, 183
(1970) (judicial trend upholding zoning ordinances which closely associate aesthetics
and property value); Comment, Zoning Ordinance-Enhancement of Aesthetic Values
Alone Not Sufficient Basisfor Exercise of Police Power in Florida, 4 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 163, 168 (1976). See also note 9 supra.
12. See note 7 supra.
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recognize that architecture is art,13 a form of self or symbolic expres-
sion.14 Artistic expression does not easily lend itself to police power
restrictions.' 5
This Note will consider the constitutional validity of legislative
regulation of architectural design when challenged by an as yet judi-
cially unexplored First Amendment right to freedom of architectural
expression. 16 Aesthetic regulation will be examined in light of recent
13. See generally Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right.- A Study in the Law of
Artists. Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940) ("When an artist
creates, be he an author, a painter, a sculptor, an architect, or musician, he does more
than bring into the world a unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he
projects into the world part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public
use.").
14. See Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 179, 181 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STANFORD Note] (architecture is "art,
self-expression, and symbolic expression").
15. See generally People v. Stever, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 471-72, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 741-
42, 191 N.E.2d 272, 277-78, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (Van Voorhis, J.,
dissenting) (zoning "is too rapidly becoming a legalized device to prevent property
owners from doing whatever their neighbors dislike"); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of
Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 76-77, 192 N.E.2d 74, 81 (1963) (Corrigan, J., dissenting)
(choice of architectural design should not be forced to succumb to "the official munic-
ipal juggernaut of conformity. . . because of the apparent belief in [the] community
of the group as a source of creativity"); Mandelker, Stoyanoff. Back to the Barri-
cades!, 22 ZONING DIGEST 288a, 288b (1971) (In discussing the court's opinion in
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970), the author asserts:
"'The court seems to accept an allegation in the case that the Stoyanoff residence was
'grotesque,' but some would argue that it was the surrounding area that was gro-
tesque, and not the Stoyanof's proposed home." The author further notes that the
excluded home's design appeared in the May, 1968 issue of Progressive Architecture.
Id at 288b-288c n.4); Williams, Subjectivity, Expression and Privacy: Problems ofAes-
thetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Williams] (the
author argues that architecture is "expressive conduct" protected by the First Amend-
ment; consequently governmental and individual interests should be reassessed in
regulations which seek to control architectural design); Note, Aesthetic Zoning, I 1
URBAN L. ANN. 295, 295-97 (1976) (opponents of aesthetic zoning assert that since
standards of beauty defy formulation, aesthetic regulations involve discriminatory
use; proponents argue that without such regulation property values and scenic areas
will be adversely affected); Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Ob-
jectiviy, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438, 1442-48 (1973) (the author attempts to refute the
arguments that aesthetics cannot or should not be reduced to objectively controllable
standards); Babcock, Billboards. Glass Houses, and the Law, HARPER'S MAGAZINE,
Apr. 1966, at 20, 24, 33 [hereinafter cited as Babcock] (the author deems the growth of
architectural control inappropriate and undesirable, and draws a distinction between
architectural control ordinances and legitimate ordinances which protect the natural
environment).
16. For two excellent articles exploring this possible limitation on architectural
control ordinances, see Williams, supra note 15, at I (the author considers and rejects
1979]
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Supreme Court directives concerning free speech. This Note will
suggest that while states may legitimately regulate architecture in the
interests of safety and health, state interests in architectural conform-
ity may be insufficient to justify abridgment of this artistic expression.
I. ARCHITECTURAL EXPRESSION
The first question to be considered is whether architectural expres-
sion is protected by the First Amendment. While the First Amend-
ment expressly protects "speech" from abridgment, 7 it has been
interpreted to encompass certain conduct accompanying protected
speech.' 8 Artistic self-expressions which involve more than words
have therefore been extended constitutional protection:
The actor on the stage or screen, the artist whose creation is in
oil or clay or marble, the poet whose reading public may be
practically nonexistent, the musician and his musical scores...
these too are beneficiaries of freedom of expression.' 9
No cases have yet, however, considered the applicability of First
privacy and autonomy claims as protection for architectural "expressive conduct" in
favor of the potentially more forceful First Amendment claim); STANFORD Note
supra note 14, at 179 (the author asserts that architectural controls stifle three types of
constitutionally protected expression-self-expression, art and symbolic expres-
sion-and concludes that zoning ordinances which control aesthetic design of private
residences are often constitutionally deficient).
17. U.S. CONsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances."
18. See generally Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 410-11 (1973) ("In United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) . . . [a]lthough O'Brien's activity involved
"conduct" rather than pure 'speech,' the Court did not define away the First Amend-
ment concern, and neither did it rule that the presence of communicative intent neces-
sarily rendered O'Brien's actions immune to governmental regulation."); Note,
Symbolic Speech, 9 IND. L. REy. 1009, 1011, 1014 (1976) (courts have expanded the
scope of the First Amendment in the area of symbolic speech, but in most post-
O'Brien cases have required only a showing of a "rational basis for state action which
infringes on symbolic speech"). Because architecture involves three areas of protected
speech, see note 14 supra, it should not be scrutinized under an intermediate level of
review. See STANFORD Note, supra note 18, at 186 n.34, 187 (in order "[t]o avoid the
arbitrariness that results from labeling an activity as speech or conduct, which thereby
determines the degree of state justification required to uphold the regulation, all sym-
bolic speech deserves the same degree of protection as that accorded to so-called pure
speech . . . [which is] the strictest level of scrutiny the Court applies whenever the
State would infringe upon a fundamental right").
19. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
[Vol 16 273
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Amendment protections to architecture,2" although architecture has
throughout history been recognized as an important art form:
An architect--or the builder of a house working through an ar-
chitect-uses brick as a painter uses canvas or a writer uses
words to express his notions of beauty and comfort, as well as
many of his social values. . . .[A]t least the aesthetic features of
residential architecture warrants constitutional protection like
that accorded other forms of self-expression.2'
The fact that architecture is also functional 22 and that it is generally
an economic venture between architect and client should be irrele-
vant to the threshold constitutional inquiry.23 By analogy, books,
20. Two reasons may explain this void. First, American society generally places
artists and their creations on a low echelon in the scale of important interests. See
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right:. A Stud' in the Law of Artists. Authors and Cre-
ators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 554 (1940) ("In this country, scant recognition has been
given overtly, aside from the copyright law, to the legal problems raised by artistic
creativeness. Constant reference must be made to continental jurisprudence where
the protection of the artist has been developed to a fine degree."); Comment, Toward
Artistic Integrirty Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American
Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1544-45 (1972) ("American courts, with their
commercial orientation, have failed to develop a sensitivity for the needs of artists").
Second is the possibility that architects and their clients, in order to avoid potentially
expensive litigation, simply conform to an area's architectural restrictions or build
elsewhere. This fact may serve to invalidate ordinances which have an impermissible
"chilling" effect on First Amendment freedoms. Cf Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) (a state statute will be invalidated if it is "not readily
subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts,. . . and its deterrent effect on
legitimate expression is both real and substantial"). See also Williams, supra note 15,
at 32.
21. STANFORD Note, supra note 14, at 185.
22. Id. at 182 n.l I ("the state interests arising from the functional elements of
architecture are not relevant to the threshold inquiry, but to the balancing of the
individual against the state interests"). See also Williams, supra note 15, at 24 n.81.
("Conflicting values play a role in the process of first amendment analysis but not in
the threshold issue of identifying the expressive character of the conduct regulated.").
23. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) ("[T]his Court has never suggested
that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself
to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the
First Amendment."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) ("[Speech does not lose its First Amendment pro-
tection because money is spent to project it. . .even [if] it is carried in a form that is
'sold' for profit").
The recent Supreme Court extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech "rest[s] on an analysis which balance[s] the listeners' and society's interests in
commercial speech against the state's justifications for regulation." The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 72, 199-200 (1977). The application of the com-
mercial speech doctrine to architectural design control was considered in STANFORD
1979]
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often written for the sole purpose of commercial profitability, are
nevertheless accorded a high degree of constitutional protection.24 A
theater owner does not lose his First Amendment protection even
though his primary motive for displaying a film may be economic,
rather than creative.
Note, supra note 14, at 179, although the article was written before the Supreme
Court explicitly extended constitutional protection to some commercial speech in Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). Thus, the article's depiction of the "arguably inferior status" of commercial
speech, STANFORD Note, supra note 14, at 181 n.10, may take on new dimensions.
Presumably, the Virginia State Bd test will apply to determine whether commercial
architecture deserves constitutional protection. The public's interest in commercial
architecture will thus be a relevant factor, and although "not all commercial messages
contain the same or even a very great public interest element[,] [t]here are few to
which such an element. . . could not be added." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
In addition, the requirements announced in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977), may apply to the inquiry concerning constitu-
tional protection for commercial speech. Also, limits on the protection to be afforded
to commercial architecture possibly exist under the principles announced in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young, the Court stated: "The
mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amend-
ment is subject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason
for invalidating these ordinances." Id at 62. A distinction can, however, be drawn
between the "material" regulated in Young and regulation of architectural design.
The ordinances involved in Young sought to restrict the location of "theaters which
exhibit sexually explicit 'adult' movies." Id at 52. Architectural design is arguably a
"commercial exploitation of material" in which the state may not have such a strong
interest in restricting for the purpose of preserving "the quality of urban life." Id. at
71.
24. See generally STANFORD Note, supra note 14, at 182-83. The author discusses
Supreme Court consideration of written works and application of the obscenity doc-
trine and concludes that protection of artistic expression in the form of architecture
may depend on the design's "seriousness" or its ability to convey ideas. Id at 183
n.17. Because architectural expression does not encompass obscenity normally ex-
cluded from First Amendment protection, it is not clear whether these tests should
have any force in justifying restrictions on architectural expression.
25. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (owners
of adult movie theaters challenged a zoning ordinance requiring dispersal of such
theaters); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (owners of drive-in
movie theaters challenged an ordinance prohibiting movies containing nudity where
movie screens were visible from public places). See generally STANFORD Note, supra
note 14, at 181 n.10. The author argues that protecting the right of expression may
restrict the range of parties with standing and concludes that developers of tract hous-
ing and commercial builders will be excluded. The author further notes that archi-
tects may also be excluded unless the design is for their own structure. It is, however,
arguable that all architects should be protected under the First Amendment even
where their work reflects the clients' desires. An analogy may be made to the protec-
tion afforded a book: the First Amendment will protect the author's freedom of ex-
[Vol. 16.273
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Similarly, a future homeowner who hires an architect should not
be prohibited from challenging governmental infringement of free
expression. It is the artistic expression itself which is protected.26
The functional utility, the commercial nature of the transaction, or
the combined commercial interests of two or more people in that ex-
pression should not impair the conclusion that architecture, as artistic
expression, deserves protection under the First Amendment.
II. BALANCING THE INTERESTS IN ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN
Under the police power, states enact zoning enabling acts for the
"public welfare"27 which in turn authorize municipalities to pass ar-
chitectural design review ordinances.28 The typical design review or-
dinance establishes a review board which is authorized to review the
design of new structures. Standards in design review ordinances may
be specific 21 or may simply limit the extent to which a proposed
structure can depart from existing design in the proposed neighbor-
hood."0 If the structure does not conform to the review board's inter-
pression whether the book is written for the author's own benefit or commissioned for
the benefit of another individual.
26. Cf Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("[W]here a speaker exists ... the protection afforded is to
the communication, to its source, and to its recipients"). See generally Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("freedom of speech
means the right to communicate, whatever the physical means for doing so").
27. See generaly Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (The public welfare
values that which is "spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.");
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926) (all zoning regula-
tions "must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the
public welfare"); Chicago B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. State ex rel. Drainage Comm'rs, 200
U.S. 561, 592 (1906) ("the police power of a State embraces regulations designed to
promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations
designed to promote the public health, the public morals, or the public safety"); State
ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 267, 69 N.W.2d 217,
220 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (regulations which seek to promote pub-
lic convenience or general prosperity are within the police power of the state).
28. STANFORD Note, supra note 14, at 180.
29. Specific design requirements are especially prevalent in the historical zoning
context. See, e.g., City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d
13 (1964). See also, D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 920
(2nd ed. 1971) (quoting the Lake Forest, Illinois, Architectural Control Ordinance
which "governs both similarity and dissimilarity in design").
30. See notes 7 & 8 supra. Cf South of Second Assoc. v. Georgetown, 580 P.2d
807, 8 10-1 1 (Colo. 1978) (unclear delineation of historic preservation areas held void
for vagueness because "a property owner cannot reasonably ascertain which architec-
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pretation of the ordinance and the developer refuses to modify the
design, the structure cannot be built on the proposed site. Design
review will often, therefore, impose substantial limitations on archi-
tectural expression.
It must be conceded that the right to freedom of expression is not
absolute.31 A municipality may be justified in restricting architec-
tural expression depending on the public interest to be furthered by
the regulation, 32 and the degree of protection architectural expression
may eventually be accorded by the courts. 3 3
A. Governmental Interests in Regulating Design
Although early decisions restricted the employment of police
power to "necessary" regulation,34 the scope of this power has been
expanded to include regulations for the "general welfare" or "general
tural designs would entitle him to a certificate of appropriateness"); Morristown Rd.
Assocs. v. Mayor of Bernardsville, 163 N.J. Super. 58, 394 A.2d 157 (1978) (design
review ordinance held void as vague and indefinite).
31. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) ("[t]he prohibition on encroach-
ment of First Amendment protections is not an absolute"); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) ("Where communication of ideas, protected by the First
Amendment, is not involved, or the particular privacy of the home. . . or any of the
other 'areas or zones' of constitutionally protected privacy, the mere fact that, as a
consequence, some human 'utterances' or 'thoughts' may be incidentally affected does
not bar the state from acting to protect legitimate state interests."); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) ("even the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not
absolute").
32. See generally Williams, supra note 15, at 24-28; STANFORD Note, supra note
14, at 190, 196.
33. See generally Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)
("The question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment often
depends on the content of the speech"); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each medium of expression . . . must be assessed for First
Amendment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems"); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974) ("the
nature of the forum and the conflicting interests involved have remained important in
determining the degree of protection afforded by the Amendment to the speech in
question."); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (every
medium of communication "is a law unto itself'); Richardson, Freedom of Expression
and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25, 40 (1951) (invalidation of a stat-
ute must rest on the fact that other interests have been valued too much in compari-
son to the right of free expression); Note, Freedom of Expression in the Land Use
Planning Context: Preserving the Barrier of Presumptive Validity, 28 U. FLA. L. REV.
954, 956 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FLORIDA Note]; Comment, Zoning, Aesthetics and
the First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 81, 107 (1964).
34. See note I supra.
[Vol 16 273
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/7
POLICE POWER ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN
prosperity." 5 Clearly within the scope of the general welfare are de-
sign review ordinances which regulate the safety of the design or
materials of a new structure.36 At the opposite end of the spectrum of
police power regulations are ordinances based primarily or solely on
aesthetic interests.37 The intermediate, more moderate, ordinance
purports to justify design restrictions for the purpose of protecting
and preserving property values within a community or neighbor-
hood.3 s
To date, the local interest in regulating architectural design has
been challenged only by claims of due process. Against such claims
courts have upheld the validity of design review ordinances3 9 using a
35, See note 28 supra.
36. Building safety and health codes are based on these state interests and are
generally upheld, presumably because the state interest is great in protecting its citi-
zens. There are relatively objective standards available to delineate what is necessary
to protect health and safety. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING IN OUR URBAN ENVIRON-
MENT 741-43 (2d ed. 1971); 13 AM. JUR. 2D Buildings 52 (1964). See also note 28
supra.
37. Courts which uphold such regulation often cite Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954), where the Supreme Court stated that the concept of "public welfare" includes
"aesthetic as well as monetary" considerations. Id at 33. See, e.g. Donnelly & Sons,
Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 717 (Mass. 1975) (relies on Berman's
expansion of "public welfare" to conclude that "aesthetics alone may justify the exer-
cisc of police power"); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 467, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 738,
191 N.E.2d 272, 275 (1963) (relies on Berman to sustain an ordinance and posits aes-
thetics as a valid subject of legislative concern); State ex rel Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 271, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841
(1955) (after Berman, the zoning power may probably be exercised for purely aes-
thetic reasons). See generally Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV.
26, 29 (1960); Note, Aesthetic Zoning, 11 URBAN L. ANN. 295, 302 (1976).
Because Berman primarily dealt with an eminent domain proceeding rather than
with the validity of a zoning ordinance, 348 U.S. at 27, not all courts are willing to use
Berman to uphold an exercise of the police power for purely aesthetic considerations.
See Comment, On the Threshold of a Taking: Limits on Municipal Exclusion of Bill-
boards, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 128 (1976) ("Despite the pronouncement of
Berman, police power restrictions for the sake of aesthetics alone have usually been
rejected by the courts."). But see Williams, supra note 15, at 2, 4 (Courts use the
Berman rationale to uphold most aesthetic regulation).
38. See, e.g., Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541, 548 (D. Kan. 1928) (The stabi-
lization of property values "is probably the most cogent reason back of zoning ordi-
nances."), State ex rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 267,
69 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (police power justifies
protecting property values).
39. See, e.g., State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); Pis-
citelli v. Township Comm., 103 N.J. Super. 589, 598-99, 248 A.2d 274, 279 (Sup. Ct.
Law Div. 1968); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d
74 (1963); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 46-48, 400 P.2d 255, 261-62 (1965); State
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presumption of constitutional validity and a policy of judicial defer-
ence to local legislative judgments.4" An individual is usually ac-
corded neither a right to build nor a right to build in a particular
architectural style.4 '
ex rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
40. For some cases decided under a presumption of constitutional validity against
claims of due process deprivation, see generally Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502,
525 (1933) ("the guarantee of due process. . . demands only that the law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real
and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained."); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388, 395 (1926) (if zoning legislation purposes are
"fairly debatable" and not "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable," then "the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control"); Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising
Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 716 (Mass. 1975) ("The by-law is presumed to be valid and, if
reasonableness is fairly debatable, the judgment of the local legislative body must be
sustained."); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 47, 400 P.2d 255, 261 (1961) (the
policy of exercising greater judicial restraint in passing upon the validity of legislation
which controls economic interests extended to legislation regulating aesthetics). Con-
Ira, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 502 (1977) (housing ordi-
nance which affects the "family" violates the due process clause); Pacesetter Homes,
Inc. v. Village of Olympia Fields, 104 Ill. App. 2d 218, 220, 244 N.E.2d 369, 372-73
(1968) (ordinance delegating a committee power to deny a permit if the committee
"believes" that the proposed construction "may" cause "harmful effects" held inva-
lid). See also FLORIDA Note, supra note 32, at 955, 984 ("[t]he presumptive validity
accorded zoning legislation has consistently prevailed over challenges based on prop-
erty rights").
Traditional judicial deference to zoning regulations has been eroded in New Jersey
by a court's requirement in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), that communi-
ties provide for their "fair share" of low-income regional housing needs. See, e.g.,
Home Builders League of South Jersey, Inc., v. City of Berlin, 157 N.J. Super. 586,
385 A.2d 295, 303 (1978). If other courts are willing to follow New Jersey's progres-
sive stance, closer judicial scrutiny of municipal regulations can be expected, espe-
cially when the regulations exclude low- and moderate-income families from the
regulating municipality. Design ordinances which have a similar effect may be invali-
dated under such a judicial analysis.
41. See Note, Regulation of Land Use: From Magna Carla to a Just Formulation,
23 UCLA L. RE. 904, 905, 918 (1976) (recent case law trend suggesting that land
ownership no longer includes a right to develop). Cf. Michelman, supra note 11, at
41; Toward a Practical Standard/or Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRAC. LAW. 36, 41 (Feb.
1969) ("[A]ssume that what A does is to build a deck house in B's neighborhood,
which so far is populated only by Tudor-style, Georgian-style, and New England
Colonial-style homes. Can it really be said that by buying into such a neighborhood,
B somehow staked out a claim not to be exposed to contemporary architecture?").
Procedural due process claims are similarly unsuccessful because adequate proce-
dures in the review of architectural design are generally provided by municipalities.
Ordinances usually establish an architectural review board to review applications and
provide the future homeowner an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Board of Super-
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Courts will generally not invalidate an architectural design review
ordinance when the express purpose of the ordinance is the preserva-
tion and protection of property values.42 When "aesthetics and eco-
nomics can be assumed to coalesce,"43 the regulation is often deemed
a valid promotion of legitimate state interests.' Local legislatures
need not conclusively prove the validity of their assumptions con-
cerning the relationship between economics and aesthetics. 5
Whether a proposed structure will adversely affect property values4 6
is generally irrelevant to the validity of a design review ordinance, if
such an assumption is "reasonable" or "debatable. 47 Consequently,
visors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199 (Va. 1975). Where municipalities do not provide
proper procedural safeguards, a claim of infringement of architectural expression
may invalidate the ordinance as an impermissible prior restraint under the principles
announced in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). The
Conrad case, involving a community's refusal to permit a theater to operate on the
basis of the content of performances shown, might be distinguished from an architec-
tural review case: architectural expression may be considered more intrusive due to
its permanence than the performance of a play in a theater. Yet where architectural
review boards work with vague standards, their "unbridled discretion" may be con-
sidered a "danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment
freedoms . . . too great" to be justified. Id at 553. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 415 (1974) (impermissible prior restraint where "regulations fairly invited
prison officials and employees to apply their own personal prejudices and opinions as
standards for prisoner mail censorship"). See also, City of West Palm Beach v. State
ev rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 864, 30 So.2d 491, 492 (1947) (ordinance controlling
architecture impermissibly vague); Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia
Fields, 104 Ill. App. 2d 218, 226, 244 N.E.2d 369, 372 (1968) (improper delegation
where standards in ordinance are too vague). See generally Barnett, Puzzle of Prior
Restraint, 29 STAN. L. Rev. 539, 543 (1977).
42. See note 11 supra.
43. United Adv. Corp. v. Metuchen, 43 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d 447, 449 (1964)
("There are some areas in which aesthetics and economics coalesce. . . .[These] con-
cepts of congruity [are] held so widely that they are inseparable from the enjoyment
and hence the value of property").
44. See note II supra.
45. See, e.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d
74, 76. 78 (1968) (despite testimony by an architect that denial of a building permit
was not based on the structure's adverse effect on neighboring property values, the
court upheld the refusal to issue a permit). See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 62 (1973) (dicta that "[t]he fact that a congressional directive
reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the peaple, including impon-
derable aesthetic assumptions, is not sufficient reason to find that statute unconstitu-
tional").
46. See generally Williams, supra note 15, at 20 n.63; FLORIDA Note, supra note
14, at 191 n.64.
47. See note 40 supra. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 71 (1976) ("It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the city's] deci-
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whether these ordinances actually preserve property values and
thereby promote the public welfare is a question generally not con-
sidered by the courts.48
Courts willing to uphold design ordinances based solely on aes-
thetic considerations 49 rely upon municipal justifications which often
stretch the police power to an extreme. These courts implicitly as-
sume that the standards are not impermissibly vague or incapable of
objectivity. Such decisions assume that aesthetically conforming
sion .... [T]he city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one
that must be accorded high respect."); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)
("Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."); Cusack Co. v. City
of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (the Court will interfere with local legislative
authority which is "primarily the judge of public welfare" only when it is clear that
legislation has "no real or substantial relation" to "the public health, safety, morals,
or to the general welfare").
Judicial deference in the zoning context may be compared with the obscenity case
of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973), where the Court noted:
Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behav-
ior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably deter-
mine that such a connection does or might exist.
See generally Note, Aesthetic Zoning, I 1 URBAN L. ANN. 305-06 (1976) (judicial def-
erence provides no basis for determining whether aesthetic regulations are reasonable
or unreasonable).
48. STANFORD Note, supra note 14, at 191 n.64 ("courts have rarely explored the
consequences of accepting the property value argument to justify architectural con-
trols;" judicial refusal to scrutinize these justifications may result in unreasonable ex-
clusions of classes of people or structures). See FLORIDA Note, supra note 32, at 967-
68 (the presumption of constitutional validity accorded to zoning regulation allows
courts "to clothe their decisions with generalities and to avoid complex issues" and
courts "may be reluctant to cast aside presumptive validity to apply the close scrutiny
required when a fundamental right is at issue" because of the difficulty of the task of
inquiring into the policies and motives behind legislation).
Assumptions concerning property value may be legitimate in the zoning context
because of the difficulty of proving detriment to property value. The uncertainty of
economic impact was discussed in dicta in Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1. 10
(1973): "in most zoning cases, the precise impact on value may, at the threshold of
litigation over validity, not yet be known."
See also Williams, supra note 15, at 19-20.
49. See note 37 supra.
50. See Dukeminier, Zoningfor Aesthetic Objectives.- .4 Reappraisal, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 218, 225-27 [hereinafter cited as Dukeminier] (1955) (although
"beauty" cannot be precisely defined, courts are accustomed to dealing with elusive
terms such as "wealth, property, malice"). See generally MICHIGAN Note, supra note
5, at 1442-47. But see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70 (1973) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) ("Art and literature reflect tastes; and tastes, like musical apprecia-
tion, are hardly reducible to precise definitions."); City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros.
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architecture should be promoted for the general welfare of the com-
munity5" or that dissimilar structures will constitute a type of "visual
nuisance. 52 Many authorities urge, however, that architectural
beauty cannot be defined and consequently should not be regulated
by municipalities." Although aesthetic interests in cultural and envi-
ronmental preservation might justify historical zoning and billboard
regulation,5 4 an aesthetic justification for regulating architecture to
preserve community character or architectural conformity arguably
does not deserve the same deference."
Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661, 148 N.E. 842, 844 (1925) ("city councils might never
agree as to what the public needs from an aesthetic standpoint, and this fact makes
the aesthetic standard entirely impractical as a standard for use restriction on prop-
erty."); Norton, Police Power, Planning andAesthetis, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW 171, 183
(1967) ("good taste and aesthetic sensitivity cannot be guaranteed either for city offi-
cials or for judges"); Comment, Zoning Ordinance-Enhancement of Aesthetic Values
Alone Not Sufficient Basis for Exercise of Police Power in Florida, 4 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 163, 168 n.29 (1976) (the major problem for boards of architectural review is the
lack of definite and objective standards).
51. See note 37 supra.
52. See, e.g., People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 468, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 739, 191
N.E.2d 272, 276 (1963), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (the court analogized
nuisance theory, citing the test of "visual nuisance:" "conduct which is unnecessarily
offensive to the usual sensibilities of the average person"). Cf Babcock, supra note
15, at 23 (author calls the Stover test "a dreadful criterion for public regulation in a
democratic society"). See generally Comment, Zoning. Aesthetics and the First
Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 81, 85, 91 (1964) (the author discusses judicial exten-
sion of protection traditionally afforded to aural and olfactory nuisances to offensive
objects and concludes that the "range and complexity of aesthetic objectives" would
make this extension particularly vulnerable to subjective determinations); Cromwell
v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 272, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 30, 225 N.E.2d 749, 755 (1967) ("[In
zoning matters], [tihe eye is entitled to as much recognition as the other senses, but, of
course, the offense to the eye must be substantial and be deemed to have material
effect on the community or district pattern").
53. See notes 15 & 50 supra.
54. See generalv Babcock, supra note 15, at 30 (the government should protect
landmarks and "natural amenities"); MICHIGAN Note, supra note 11, at 1463 (the
reduction of aesthetic natural resources calls for effective legal protection).
55. See generall' Anderson, supra note 11, at 29 (the purpose of architectural con-
trols is "to improve community appearance by preventing extremes of dissimilarity or
monotony"); Babcock, supra note 15, at 24, 33 (growing architectural control is inap-
propriate and may be distinguished from desirable ordinances which protect the natu-
ral environment); Michelman, supra note 11, at 36, 37 ("The effect on market value
...is derivative or symptomatic [of aesthetic considerations]"). See also note 9
supra Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Propero , Values and the Judicial Decisional Proc-
ess, 35 Mo. L. REV. 176 (1976) (the principal purpose of aesthetic zoning is "to en-
hance or preserve the appearance of the community by eliminating or reducing
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B. The Constitutional Weight of Architectural Expression
Although aesthetics and property value preservation may be
deemed legitimate state interests properly furthered through police
power regulation, no municipal ordinance can oppressively infringe
on fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. 6 Legitimate
state interests must still be weighed against fundamental individual
interests.5 7 Yet even if architectural expression is extended First
Amendment protection by the courts, states still may restrict some
architectural design, since protected speech may be constitutionally
regulated under certain circumstances.58 However, the state's burden
dissimilarity, monotony, and incongruity in the physical appearance of structures in
the neighborhood").
56. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (city ordinance
affecting the family); Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974) (ordinance restricting
occupation of dwellings violated no fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (judicial deference to zoning legisla-
tion will cease if the legislation infringes on constitutionally protected rights). Cf
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (state action may not invade "'the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control' "); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 405 (1974) ("a policy ofjudicial restraint cannot encompass any failure to take
congizance of valid constitutional claims"). See also Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, 431 U.S. 494, 513-14 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The holding in Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, that a city could use its police power, not just to
abate a specific use of property which proved offensive, but also to create and imple-
ment a comprehensive plan for the use of land in the community, vastly diminished
the rights of individual property owners. It did not, however, totally extinguish those
rights. On the contrary, that case expressly recognized that the broad zoning power
must be exercised within constitutional limits").
57. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) (First Amendment
interests must be weighed against the importance of countervailing state interests),
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 n.16 (1976) (First Amendment interests balanced
against the governmental interest in regulation); Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor
Adv. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 722 (Mass. 1975) (governmental interests outweighed First
Amendment interests).
See generally The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. 72, 205 (1977) (in
noncommercial speech cases the Court requires "a compelling state interest. . . sub-
stantially furthered . . .by the least intrusive means possible;" in commercial speech
cases the Court applies a balancing approach but places "a heavy burden on the
state"). See also Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of the Courts,
65 HARV. L. REv. 1, 47 (1951) ("It has not always been conceded. . . that the protec-
tion of property rights is any less fundamental to the preservation of liberty than
freedom of speech and of the press").
58. See Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93
(1977) ("time, place, or manner" restrictions on protected speech are presumptively
more valid than restrictions based on content); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716
(1977) (infringement of First Amendment interests may be justified by a counter-
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of proof would be reversed in a First Amendment challenge since
there would no longer be a presumption of constitutional validity.5 9
Consequently, the weight which may be accorded architectural ex-
pression will be relevant to the balance between state and individual
interests.
Each medium of expression is governed by its own rules.6o Archi-
tectural expression cannot be accorded the same protection afforded
"pure speech" 61 since it necessarily involves some action apart from
vailing state interest which is "sufficiently compelling"); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
360 (1976) (although there is "a presumptive prohibition on infringement" on First
Amendment interests, "[r]estraints are permitted for appropriate reasons"); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18, 26 (1976) (if a regulation is not a "reasonable time, place, and
manner" regulation, it may nevertheless be justified by a "constitutionally sufficient
justification"); Erznoznik v. City of Jacsonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) ("A state or
Municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting reasonable time, place and
manner regulations applicable to all speech irrespective of content. . . .But when the
government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First
Amendment strictly limits its power"). See also Williams, supra note 15, at 33-34
(competing interests must be balanced, but in the architectural regulation context, the
state's interest is the "risk" of "an unusually rich property owner, indifferent to the
dissipation of his wealth, who happens to have what the community regards as mon-
strous taste. . .[and who builds] on such a scale that normal planting will not block
the structure out," which the author deems a trivial risk).
59. See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM.
BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 521, 545 (1977) ("[E]ven if speech activities cannot
pervasively be distinguished from many other claims of liberty on the ground of re-
spect for the essence of the individual self, the fact remains that those aspects of lib-
erty that involve speech receive the most explicit endorsement in the test of the
Constitution and for that reason alone may properly be singled out for special judicial
protection."); FLORIDA Note, supra note 32, at 983 ("Since strict scrutiny applies in
the context of freedom of expression, the courts should be obliged to pierce the barrier
of presumptive validity to examine and balance competing policies."); Comment,
Zoning, Aesthetics and the First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 81, 106 (1964)
("[T]he presumption of constitutionality normally accorded legislative enactments is
'frankly reversed' when a statute is challenged as an abridgement of free speech").
60. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each
medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by
standards suited to it, for each may present its own problems."); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (every medium of communication "is
a law unto itself'). There is disagreement as to the weight which must be accorded
expression. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974)
("the managerial decision to limit car card space to innocuous and less controversial
commercial and service oriented advertising does not rise to the dignity of a First
Amendment violation").
61. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Note, First Amendment Protection
for CommercialAdvertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 205,
225 (1976).
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the expression. Because architectural expression combines artistic ex-
pression with functional utility,62 it may not be perfectly analogous to
other art forms 63 or to "symbolic speech."64 Yet it should not be sub-
62. See genera/lr STANFORD Note, supra note 14, at 182 n.11, 183 n.17. The au-
thor suggests that whether a structure's design will warrant First Amendment protec-
tion may depend on the design's primary purpose. Thus a determination as to
whether a design is primarily functional or aesthetic will aid a court in balancing
architectural expression against the State's interest in health, safety, and preservation
of property values. Whether this distinction is necessary in a First Amendment analy-
sis is questionable. As noted earlier in the text, books and other art forms may also be
functional yet are not denied First Amendment protection.
63. The permanence of a large structure such as a house or office building may
serve to distinguish architecture from other art forms, which are not permanently
intrusive, such as books, paintings and sculpture. See, e.g., Running Fence Corp. v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 400, 412, 124 Cal. Rptr. 339, 347 (1975) (the artist
was permitted for a period of 14 days to display his "Running Fence," "an 18-foot
high heavy white nylon fabric fence hung from a steel cable strung between steel
poles, generally 62 feet apart, for a distance of 24 miles"). See also Williams, supra
note 15, at 24 (Although architecture "will normally raise a captive audience issue
that rarely arises in connection with other forms of artistic expression," this fact
should not affect First Amendment protection.).
64. The Court considered governmental regulations in the context of symbolic
speech in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). The Court stated
"that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
elements can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id at
376. The Court put forth a test to determine when governmental regulation is justi-
fied:
1) if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and
4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id at 377.
The type of conduct sought to be regulated is relevant to the sufficiency of govern-
mental interest in regulation. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976), the Court
considered the government's justification for restriction on political contributions and
concluded: "We cannot share the view that the present Act's contribution and expen-
diture limitations are comparable to the restrictions on conduct upheld in O'Brien.
The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction
of a draft card." The Court struck the provision, holding it "beyond dispute that the
interest in regulating the alleged 'conduct' . . . 'arises in some measure because the
communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful,' " and
because the provision was not "a reasonable time, place and manner regulation." Id
at 17-18.
The type of conduct embraced within the term "symbolic speech" thus appears to
be conduct of a more transient nature than the erection of a building. See, e.g., STAN-
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ject to the stricter regulations imposed upon commercial speech65 for
it is expression more ideological than commercial. 66 An architect's
interest in his design may be primarily economic; yet he still merits
First Amendment protection.67 However, the degree of First Amend-
ment protection afforded to architectural expression may still depend
upon "the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests in-
volved"68 and also the content of the communication. 69
Consequently no concrete yardstick exists to measure the legal im-
FORD Note, supra note 14, at 185 n.30 (symbolic expression principles applied in the
school context in litigation over hair styles and length).
See generally People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 466, 191 N.E.2d 272, 276, 240
N.Y.S,2d 734, 739 (1963) (ordinance which prohibits clotheslines without permit im-
poses no -arbitrary or capricious standard of beauty or conformity," but merely pros-
cribes certain offensive conduct); Note, Symbolic Speech, 9 IND. L. REv. 1009, 1011,
1014 (1976) (While courts have extended First Amendment protection to musical ex-
pression after O'Brien, most cases "have only required a showing of a rational basis
for state action which infringes on symbolic speech.").
65. The content of commercial speech may determine whether or not the expres-
sion is protected under the First Amendment. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-73 n.24 (1976).
66. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.. 425 U.S. 748, 779-80 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("Ideological expression, be
it oral, literary, pictorial, or theatrical, is integrally related to the exposition of
thought. . . . Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideo-
logical expression because it is confined to the promotion of goods or services.").
If commercial expression is defined as that which "promot[es] ... goods and serv-
ices," id, arguably architecture which has such a commercial effect might be sub-
jected to the stricter regulations associated with commercial speech. However, even a
building constructed with the intent of "promot[ing] ... goods and services," such as
a standard-designed fast-food restaurant, should not be considered so "commercial"
as to preclude any First Amendment protection. See also note 23 supra.
67. Cf Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (an advertiser's commercial speech interest, although
"purely economic," does not preclude First Amendment protection)- Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976), ("[Tlhis Court has never suggested that the dependence
of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a non-
speech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment.")
68. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974).
69. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) ("Even
within the area of protected speech, a difference in content may require a different
governmental response."). Cf Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) ("If there is a kind of commercial
speech that lacks all First Amendment protection. . . , it must be distinguished by its
content."). See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)
("[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public
from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the
First Amendment strictly limits its power.").
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portance of architectural expression.7° Yet if architectural expression
is extended First Amendment protection, traditional judicial defer-
ence to legislative judgments against due process attacks on design
ordinances must give way.7 A First Amendment claim will cast a
locality's proffered justifications "in a different light' 7 2 than when at-
tacked by due process claims.73
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF RESTRICTIONS ON
PROTECTED SPEECH
A. The First Amendment Standards of Review
The Supreme Court employs a strict scrutiny approach in noncom-
mercial speech cases. This test requires a state interest "sufficiently
compelling," 74 furthered by the least intrusive means possible,75
where the means bear a "substantial relation"76 to the compelling
governmental interest.77 Governmental restriction of noncommercial
speech must be nondiscriminatory and justified by a state interest
"unrelated to the suppression of expression. '7' In commercial speech
70. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 778 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The scope of constitutional
protection of communicative expression is not universally inelastic.").
7 1. See notes 47 & 59 supra.
72. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976).
73. See generally Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 594-95 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[S]tate and local governing bodies ...often . . . prohibit erection of
buildings. . . which might itself in an aesthetic sense involve substantial elements of
'expressive conduct'. . . .So long as the zoning laws do not, under the guise of neu-
trality, actually prohibit the expression of ideas because of their content, they have
not been thought open to challenge under the First Amendment."); STANFORD Note,
supra note 14, at 190 ("Whether the police power justifies control of architecture in-
volving rights of expression deserves consideration unclouded by existing assump-
tions about governmental regulation of property.").
74. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).
75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63
(1976).
76. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
77. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 467 (1977) ("a
compelling public need that cannot be met in a less restrictive way will override [First
Amendment] interests.). See generally The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L.
REV. 72, 205 (1977).
78. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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cases, the Court applies a balancing approach,79 but by placing a
heavy burden on the government to justify infringement, leans to-
ward requiring a "sufficiently compelling" state interest. 8° In "sym-
bolic speech" cases, the Court requires a "sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech elements" to jus-
tify "incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."'"
Under any of these tests, the validity of ordinances controlling ar-
chitectural similarity, compatability, or neighborhood character is
questionable. Due to the heavy burden placed on government in the
commercial speech balancing approach, the commercial-noncom-
mercial distinction will not likely have a significant impact on First
Amendment challenges to design control ordinances. A "sufficiently
compelling" governmental interest should be required in either case.
Even if courts deem the less strict "symbolic speech" test applicable,
a "sufficiently important governmental interest" will be required to
justify the regulation. In any interpretation of the weight to be ac-
corded architectural expression, closer judicial scrutiny of the govern-
mental justifications of design review ordinances will be necessary
than heretofore required.
79. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 789 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech warrants a "limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment value").
80. See generalh' The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 72, 205-06
(1977) (while the court "seem[s] to state merely a balancing test ... in applying the
test the Court places a heavy burden on the state"). See also Suffolk Outdoor Adv.
Co. v. Hulse, 393 N.Y.S.2d 416, 422-23 (1977), upholding a ban of nonconforming
billboards against a First Amendment claim. The court in Suffolk distinguished Vir-
ginia State Bd because it involved a total ban of a content of speech and was not
concerned with "aesthetics or other appropriate governmental concerns, such as pub-
lic interest and safety." id at 423. The court remanded the case to determine
whether there was a reasonable relation between the regulation and governmental
purpose. Id at 425. But see Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1367 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977), in which the court invalidated as unnecessa-
rily restrictive an ordinance controlling the temporary display of political campaign
signs. Unlike the court in Suffolk, the Redwood City court noted that signs "do not
invade the home" and "can be avoided simply by not looking." Id at 1367. The city
could "impose design restrictions that would bar the more unsightly posters, without
impairing political expression." Id at 1370.
81. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). See note 64 supra.
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B. Police Power and the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has recently considered the constitutional va-
lidity of municipal regulations which infringe on First Amendment
freedoms. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,82 theater owners chal-
lenged the facial validity of an ordinance prohibiting films containing
nudity from drive-in theater screens visible in public places.8 3 In
concluding that the burden falls upon the unwilling viewer to avert
his eyes from the object which offends his sensibilities,84 the Court
held that the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests outweighed the
government's justifications for regulation." The Court found that
the ordinance under consideration was, rather than a permissible
"time, place and manner" restriction, an attempt to regulate "con-
tent" 86 and that
Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the
speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home. . . ,or the degree
of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or au-
ditor to avoid exposure."
The Court found that the huge outdoor screen in question was not
"'so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to
avoid exposure to it'" and therefore censorship of content was not
justified by the "limited privacy interest of persons on the public
streets." 88
Under Erznoznik, the case against architectural design controls
would be relatively clear were it not for two qualifying footnotes in
82. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
83. Id at 206.
84. Id at 210-11. The Court stated:
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral sensi-
bilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to decide
which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require
protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. . . . [Tihe burden normally falls
upon the viewer to 'avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by
averting [his] eyes.'
85. Id at 212.
86. Id at 209. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)
("Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and
may not be justified by reference to content alone."). But see Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 223 (1975) (Burger, J., dissenting) ("[I1t would be absurd
to suggest that [the regulation of nudity on outdoor screens] operates to suppress ex-
pression of ideas." (Emphasis in original)). See also note 78 supra.
87. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
88. Id at 212.
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the opinion. The Court distinguished the rights of unwilling viewers
which were not at issue from the rights of the theater owners which
were under consideration, 9 further noting
We are not concerned in this case with a properly drawn zoning
ordinance restricting the location of drive-in theaters or with a
nondiscriminatory nuisance ordinance designed to protect the
privacy of persons in their homes from the visual and audible
intrusions of such theaters.9°
Consequently as long as an ordinance does not restrict expression
solely "because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent,"'" a narrowly tailored ordinance protecting homeowners against
offensive "visual intrusions"92 will be valid after Erznoznik.
89. Id at 211 n.7.
90. Id at 212 n.9.
91. Id at 215, quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,95 (1972);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968). See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975). See
also Williams, supra note 15. The author states: "Even if the purpose underlying an
aesthetic regulation can be established unequivocally-for example, protection of
property values-it may not always be easy to determine whether that purpose should
be classified as related or unrelated to expression." Id at 25. Williams suggests that
this determination will require the balancing of variables, among which are the fol-
lowing:
I) the extent to which a regulation seeks to protect those who may suffer actual
harm independent of their own aesthetic preferences;
2) the extent to which a regulation is directed at specific messages rather than
general modes and manners of expression; and
3) the extent to which a regulation, while restricting some expression, may actu-
ally enhance the value of other expression.
Id at 25-27.
92. Whether the "captive audience" justification for state regulation of architec-
tural expression will be viable is unclear. The principles announced in Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), appear to have been somewhat eroded
by the stricter requirements announced in Erznoznik. See genera/y Donnelly & Sons,
Inc. v. Outdoor Adv. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 721-22 (Mass. 1975) ("due to the instrusive
quality of billboards, passers-by, whether willing or not, are compelled to see the
advertisement"); Architecture. 4esthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 179, 198 (1975) (the author suggests that the "captive audience" argument will
not likely be made for architecture under recent Supreme Court decisions). But see
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 37 (1963) ("in-
dustrialization has fundamentally altered the former relationships between property
holding and the achievement of individual rights. . . . Geographical escape has been
cut off."). See also Williams, supra note 15, at 28-29 (in a First Amendment balanc-
ing process between "the scope of the burdens placed by the design on any 'captive
audience' and by the regulation on the would-be builder," architectural review which
excludes structures merely for nonconformity to the surrounding neighborhood
"presents perhaps the weakest case for regulation.").
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In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 9 3 , the Court denied a
theater owner's First Amendment challenge against a zoning ordi-
nance requiring locational dispersal of adult theaters.94 Because
there was no limit in the ordinance on the number of theaters which
could be erected, the municipality could control the location of these
theaters just as it could regulate the location of other commercial es-
tablishments.95 Erznoznik is distinguishable to the extent it involved
a total ban on a specified content of expression. 96
The Court considered a total ban on a specified content of expres-
sion in a residential area in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro.97 The Court held for real estate agents98 challenging a
municipal ban on "For Sale" and "Sold" signs.9 9 The township as-
serted that it proposed the ban to stem "the white flight of homeown-
ers from a racially integrated community.' Viewing plaintiffs'
claim as based on a right to commercial speech,' ° the Court rejected
the township's defense that the ordinance restricted only the "method
of communication."'0 2 The Court noted that the "alternative chan-
nels for communication" which the ordinance left open were "far
from satisfactory." Further, the Court held that the purpose of the
ordinance was not to restrict the "time, place, or manner" of expres-
sion.10 3 Rather, the ban was founded on an unsubstantiated fear of
93. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
94. Id
95. Id at 62-63. See generally Note, Equal Protection and the First Amendment:
Zoning Away Skid Row, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713 (1977); Comment, Content-Based
Classffcations of Protected Speech: 4 Less Vital Interest? 1976 UTAH L. REV. 616
(1976).
96. 422 U.S. at 206.
97. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
98. Id at 98.
99. Id at 86.
100. Id
101. Id at 91-92.
102. Id at 93. For a case upholding a ban on most outdoor advertising near state
highways, see Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 762 (N. Dak. 1978) (the
statute restricts "the place and manner of outdoor advertising signs" and these "re-
strictions (I) are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, (2)
serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of the same information.").
103. 96 S. Ct. at 93-94. Cf. Commonwealth v. Sterlace, Pa. ,391 A.2d
1066 (1978) (Advertising ordinance upheld as permissible "time, place and manner"
regulation).
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the impact of the expression's content, and the purpose of the ban
was therefore to restrict the content of an expression of vital interest
to the community."° Moreover, the township failed to establish that
the ordinance was necessary to achieve or effective in achieving its
stated purpose.' ° 5
In delineating the narrow circumstances in which a municipality
may regulate content, the Linmark Court reiterated the criteria for-
mulated in Erznoznik and Young. The Court held that regulation is
appropriate when it restricts a "mode of communication that 'in-
trudes on the privacy of the home'" or when "the place or manner of
speech produces a detrimental 'secondary effect' on society."' 6 In
addition, the Court quoted United States v. O'Brien'0 7 to conclude:
The township has not prohibited all lawn signs-or all lawn
signs of a particular size or shape-in order to promote aesthetic
104. Id at 95-96. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 72, 205
n.48 (1977) (in Linmark, "the Court struck down the ordinance on the ground that its
purpose-to stem the flight of homeowners from a racially integrated commu-
nity-related directly to the message communicated."). See generally Department of
Hwys. v. National Adv. Co. 356 So.2d 557, 566-67 (La. Ct. of App. 1978) (the court
upheld a statute which distinguished between on- and off-premise signs along high-
ways against a First Amendment attack because the statute left "open. . . 'alternative
channels for communication of the information"' and "the statute [was] genuinely
concerned with the geographical location of 'speech' in order to promote legitimate
governmental interests which [were] unrelated to the suppression of free expression").
105. 97 S. Ct. at 95. Whether an ordinance's effectiveness in achieving its stated
important governmental interest will be relevant against a First Amendment chal-
lenge is unclear. In a case similar to Linmark, an ordinance prohibited real estate
signs for the stated purpose of stemming white flight. The court in Daugherty v. City
of East Point, 447 F. Supp. 290,-295-96 (N.D. Ga. 1978) held:
The fact that this ordinance was enacted and perhaps achieved an important
governmental objective does not exempt East Point from the restraints of the
First Amendment. The Court realizes the importance of the national policy of
promoting racial integration. This does not allow the Court to disregard the
rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, rights more compelling than any
national policy.
The holding in Daugherty may be relevant to architectural design ordinances based
on preserving property values. By analogy, even if the design ordinance succeeds in
preserving property values, it should not withstand a First Amendment challenge.
The distinction between Daugherty and design review ordinances purporting to pro-
tect property values may lie, however, in the fact that the Daugherty ordinance fur-
thered an important "national policy" whereas design review ordinances may purport
to protect constitutional due process rights of property owners in the community. In
design ordinances the conflict will arise between two competing constitutional guar-
antees and the balance may not be as clear as that reached in Daugherty.
106. 97 S. Ct. at 94.
107. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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values or any other value 'unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. ' 08
At first glance, this may appear to legitimize architectural design con-
trol based primarily or solely on aesthetic considerations. When
challenged by claims of infringement of free expression, however, the
aesthetic values sought to be promoted by architectural control ordi-
nances should no longer be "unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression," for it is "content," or architectural design itself, which the
ordinances regulate and restrict. At least the Court's O'Brien stand-
ards of "an important or substantial governmental interest" furthered
by restrictions "no greater than [are] essential to the furtherance of
that interest"' 9 should be required to justify governmental regula-
tion of architectural design.
C. Architectural Design Control and the First Amendment
It can be asserted that the principles enunciated in Erznoznik are
inapplicable to architectural design ordinances because these ordi-
nances do not involve total bans of certain types of architecture"'
"on the ground that they are more offensive than others."''  The
effect of ordinances specifying permissible styles of architecture or
requiring "similarity" or "compatability" to existing neighborhood
character is, however, a total ban of certain architectural styles from a
neighborhood or from a community. Regulation of the content of
architectural expression will be justified under Erznoznik if it can be
shown that the proposed structure "intrudes on the privacy of the
home" and that it is "impractical for the unwilling viewer ...to
avoid exposure.""'  It is difficult, however, to envision an architec-
tural style so intrusive as to justify governmental restriction." 3
108. 97 S. Ct. at 93-94.
109. U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See Williams, supra note 15, at 34.
110. See generalv Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) (because even funda-
mental rights are not absolute, a constitutional violation contemplates a "real abridg-
ment of the rights of free speech"); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 468, 240
N.Y.S.2d 734,739, 191 N.E.2d 272, 275 (1963) (a distinction is drawn between regula-
tory and prohibitory legislation, the former raising a higher presumption of validity);
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 94 (1963)
(the author discusses the uncertainty of when expression is impermissibly "abridged"
since the term is difficult to delineate).
I ll. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
112. Id
113. Although the rights of unwilling viewers were not at issue in Erznoznik, 422
U.S. at 211 n.7, the fact that the Court was able to conclude that a huge outdoor
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Municipalities may assert that architectural design ordinances are
permissible location restrictions based on legitimate content classifi-
cations and are thus valid exercises of police power as enunciated in
Young. In Young, the city's interest in restricting location of adult
theaters to preserve the "quality of urban life"' 14 appears more com-
pelling than interests usually asserted for restricting architectural
styles. A distinction may be drawn between the "erotic" expression
involved in Young and architectural expression to establish that the
latter should be accorded a greater degree of constitutional protec-
tion.II5 The fact that an architect may be able to build elsewhere" 6
should therefore be insufficient to validate architectural design con-
trol, since "[o]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression
in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place!"" ' 7
The validity of architectural design ordinances will depend on the
weight accorded state interests asserted for or purposes of the regula-
tion. Courts will probably uphold those architectural control ordi-
nances reflecting a "'sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element' that [is] 'unrelated to the suppres-
screen was not impermissibly "obtrusive," 422 U.S. at 212, lends support to the argu-
ment that an architectural design will rarely be impermissibly obtrusive. See note 92
supra.
114. 427 U.S. 50,72(1976).
115. See notes 61 and 95 supra.
116. See generally Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 71, 192
N.E.2d 74, 77 (1963) (although the court noted that the "structure would be a very
interesting home placed in a different environment," it concluded that the structure
would adversely affect the proposed neighborhood); MICHIGAN Note, supra note 5, at
1461 ("So long as unregulated areas exist where architects may build as they please, it
is arguable that architectural nonconformity is not unduly restricted by controls.").
117. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975), quoting
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939). Architectural controls operate within
residential and commercial land use districts. When an architect and client seek to
build in any area, use restrictions are not at issue. It is therefore arguable that they
seek to express their architectural sensibilities in "appropriate places." An analogy
may also be made to the requirement announced in Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Township of WiUingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977), that an ordinance must leave "open
ample alternative channels for communication." If, therefore, there are other areas in
a municipality in which the proposed structure may be built, it is possible that the
ordinance will be upheld. See note 116 supra. Linmark, however, involved commer-
cial speech, and as noted earlier in the text, architectural expression should not be
subjected to the stricter regulation permissible under the commercial speech doctrine.
See notes 65 and 66 supra.
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sion of free expression' "118 accomplished by the least intrusive
means possible. " 9
State interests in requiring "similar" or "compatible" architecture
for aesthetic reasons are not, however, interests "unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression."' l2  Such regulation may be invalid be-
cause it "arises in some measure because the communication
allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful."''
Moreover, requiring similarity to existing structures will likely stifle
architectural experimentation,122 adversely affecting the state's inter-
est 23 in a "beautiful community."'
t2 4
118. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
119. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
In order to determine whether the restriction is "unrelated to the suppression of
free expression," the Court in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977), inquired into the regulation's primary purposes and con-
cluded that the purpose was not properly to restrict the time, place or manner of
expression, but rather to prohibit the effect of the content of expression. Architectural
control ordinances also regulate the content of architectural expression (i.e., the de-
sign) and prohibit the effect of that expression (dissimilarity, monotony, property
value decline).
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 366, 382 (1968), the Court found that the
purpose of the regulation to further the "interest in the preservation of draft cards was
wholly unrelated to their use as a means of communication." Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 17 (1976). Under a similar analysis, architectural controls, promulgated to
maintain safety, health and property values, might be upheld as "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression." See Williams, supra note 15, at 41 ("[I]f the govern-
mental interest sought to be advanced is safety, it appears to be quite unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.").
120. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976): United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
366, 376 (1968).
121. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
366, 382 (1968).
122. See, e.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 68, 75, 192
N.E.2d 74, 75, 80 (1963) (ordinance upheld requiring conformity with structures in
neighborhood). See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THIE
FIRST AMENDMENT 11 (1963) ("Suppression promotes inflexibility and stylification,
preventing society from adjusting to changing circumstances or developing new
ideas"); Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 26 (1960); Note, Aes-
thetic Zoning: Property Values and the Judicial Decisional Process, 35 Mo. L. REV.
176 (1970).
123. Cf Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("The Constitution cannot be interpreted. . . to tolerate the imposition
by government upon the rest of us of white suburbia's preference in patterns of family
living."). But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71-72 (1976).
("It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the city's] decision.)
124. See generally Dukeminier, supra note 50, at 228 (although the author advo-
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If architectural design ordinances are justified by the goal of prop-
erty value preservation, the validity of governmental regulation is
strengthened under the traditional rule that "it is the duty of the own-
er of property to so use it that it will not injure another."'' 25 Regula-
tion of the content, or the architectural design, of the expression may
be permissible because the expression "reaches a group the township
has a right to protect" 26-neighboring property owners. Conse-
quently the government may have a "sufficiently important govern-
mental interest in regulating the nonspeech element,"' 27 or structure,
of the building. A First Amendment claim will, however, require
more substantiated evidence of adverse impacts on property value
than has previously been accepted by courts faced with due process
challenges.121 Moreover, an ordinance promulgated to preserve
cates architectural aesthetic control, he admits that the determination of what is
"beautiful" depends upon conditioning and habit, and that new design is therefore
resisted); Norton, Police Power, Planning and Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW 171,
172 (1967) (the practical application of architectural control "may represent but a
rudimentary striving for the ideal of the beautiful"); Babcock, supra note 15, at 30 ("if
we insist on a democratic decision-making process [in architectural design control],
then we are bound to substitute taste for beauty").
125. Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541, 547 (D. Kan. 1928). But see note 48
supra.
126. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,94 (1977).
127. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). See note 36 supra. Additionally,
with the growing interest in solar energy utilization, municipalities might enact regu-
lations to guarantee buildings' solar access. See generally Comment, Obstruction of
Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CAL. L. REv. 94, 95, 106-07 (1977).
128. See notes 59 and 105 supra. The degree of substantiation necessary to justify
governmental assumptions concerning the adverse impact of a proposed structure is
unclear. In the obscenity context the Court does not require "conclusive proof of a
connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material" if the governmental
assumption is reasonable. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973).
Obscenity, however, lies outside the scope of First Amendment protection, whereas
architectural expression should lie within its scope. Yet the Court has also stated in
dicta, discussing highway beautification regulation: "The fact that a congressional
directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people, including
imponderable aesthetic assumptions, is not sufficient reason to find that statute un-
constitutional," id. at 49, 62 (1973). It is therefore possible that even in the face of a
First Amendment challenge, courts will uphold "reasonable" assumptions concerning
detriment to property value. Environmental protection regulation considered in dicta
in Slaton may, however, be distinguished from architectural regulation. Something
more than the mere "shifting of economic arrangements," Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 95 (1948) (Marshall, J., concurring), is involved in environmental protection. Ar-
chitectural control ordinances are not exercised for such a broadly beneficial goal.
Although it must be conceded that property values affect taxes and public services in
a community, and thereby may affect the public welfare, Dukeminier, supra note 50,
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property value must be narrowly drawn,' 29 with the restriction "no
greater than [is] essential to the furtherance of that interest."'1 30 This
requirement may invalidate ordinances prohibiting certain classes of
architectural styles from invading specified neighborhoods.
In addition, First Amendment challenges may question the admin-
istration of ordinances purporting to preserve property value. Ordi-
nances which accord local officials broad discretion to determine
whether a particular structure will adversely affect property values
may be improper prior restraints of expression.13 1 It is no answer
that many architectural review boards are composed of one or more
architects.' 32 Ordinances delegating broad discretion are subject to
at 231-32, it is not always certain that the erection of a particular structure will, in
fact, have such a substantial effect on property values, see STANFORD Note, supra
note 14, at 191 n.64 ("aesthetic appeal and land values are not always positively corre-
lated"). See also text accompanying note 48 supra; MICHIGAN Note, slzvra note 5, at
1455-56 (architectural control legislation does not employ precise standards and de-
terminations that property values will be adversely affected are usually made by a
Board of Architects rather than a Board of Assessors); Comment, Zoning Ordi-
nance-Enhancement of Aesthetic Values Alone Not Sufficient Basisfor Exercise of Po-
lice Power in Florida, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 163, 168 n.29 (1976) (the major problem
for Boards of Architectural Review is the lack of definite, objective standards).
129. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977) ("Even were we to credit
the State's reasons and 'even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
liberties when the end can be narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridg-
ment must be viewed in light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic pur-
pose.' "); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (" '[A] State may not choose means
that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty.' ").
130. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
366, 377 (1968).
131. See note 41 supra. See also, Williams, supra note 15, at 7, 30.
132. See generally South of Second Associates v. Georgetown, 580 P.2d 807, 808
n.l (Colo. 1978) (the fact that the ordinance was amended so as not to require an
architect to sit on the architectural review board "may weigh heavily in a[n] action
concerned with an alleged arbitrary enforcement of an otherwise valid ordinance");
State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305, 309-12 (Mo. 1970) (ordinance
delegating power to three architects to deny applications upheld); Reid v. Architec-
tural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 69, 192 N.E.2d 74, 75 (1963) (ordinance dele-
gating power to board composed of three architects to deny permits upheld); State ex
rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 265, 69 N.W.2d 217, 219
(1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955) (ordinance delegating authority to board con-
sisting of three residents of village, two of whom are architects, upheld). See also City
of West Palm Beach v. State exrel Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 864,30 So.2d 491,492 (1947)
(ordinance impermissibly vague, leaving discretion to the "whim and caprice of the
administrative agency"); Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia Fields, 104 I11.
App. 2d 218, 226, 244 N.E.2d 369, 373 (1968) (improper delegation where standards
in ordinance are too vague); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (Va.
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potential abuse and, given judicial deference to local legislative judg-
ments,133 are likely to remain undiscovered. To insure valid admin-
istrative action under these statutes, a minimum level of proof of
adverse impact must be required. Architectural review boards should
not be allowed to censor expression "on the ground that [some ex-
pressions] are more offensive than others" '' unless the offensiveness
results in a demonstrable adverse impact on the community.
SUMMARY
Judicial deference to unproved legislative assumptions that certain
incompatible or "offensive" architecture will depress property values
may deter architectural innovation.13 1 One writer suggests that mis-
placed governmental controls have stifled American architectural de-
velopment: "Greece had its Acropolis and medieval Europe its great
cathedrals. For what will our imperial cities be remembered in his-
tory?"'3 6 Another writer suggests that by allowing the community to
collectively determine what is beautiful architecture, we are substitut-
ing "taste" for "beauty" with no demonstrable benefit to the major-
ity.
137
The subordination of individual artistic expression to a commu-
nity's standards 3  is an invasion of individual rights 1 9 inconsistent
1975) (Board without power under enabling acts to impose architectural design re-
strictions).
133. See notes 40 and 47 supra.
134. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). See also Bayou
Landing, Ltd. v. Watts, 563 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1977).
135. See note 122 supra But see Dukeminier, supra note 50, at 227 ("A great age
of architecture has not existed without the popular acceptance of a basic norm of
design.").
136. Hershman, Beauty as the Subject of Legislative Control, 15 PRAc. LAW. 20, 35
(Feb. 1969).
137. Babcock, supra note 15, at 28.
138. See Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 76, 192 N.E.2d
74, 81 (1963) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) ("[Appellant's] aesthetic sensibilities in connec-
tion with her selection of design for her proposed home (should not] be stifled because
of the apparent belief in this community of the group as a source of creativity.").
139. See generally EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 32, 37, 115 (1963) (the theory of freedom of expression requires that
each individual's right be protected, but because the political structure of legislatures
does not provide such protection to "vulnerable" unorganized sectors, "a deliberate,
affirmative, and even aggressive effort" must be made to protect freedom of expres-
sion); Norton, Police Power, Planning and Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW 171, 182-
83 (1962) (devotees of "modem" architecture are probably a "permanent minorit,");
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with the American goal of tolerance. 4 ' The Constitution requires
protection of fundamental individual rights, especially when their ex-
ercise results in no demonstrable detriment to others.' 41 The general
public welfare will be better promoted by recognizing the First
Amendment rights of architects and their clients so that they may
achieve great architecture.142 Ordinances regulating architectural de-
sign should therefore be reexamined by states and municipalities.
Such regulation should be narrowly tailored to accomplish "suffi-
ciently compelling" or at least "important" state interests in order to
accommodate the fundamental constitutional rights of the individual
in our society.
FLORIDA Note, supra note 32, at 962-63 ("The increased intervention of government
into private affairs to safeguard individual rights creates a real and substantial threat
of governmental interference with those rights.").
140. See generally People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 472, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734. 742,
191 N.E.2d 272, 278 (1963) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) ("In our age of conformity it
is still not possible for all to be exactly alike, nor is it the instinct of our law to compel
uniformity wherever diversity may offend the sensibilities of those who cast the larg-
est number of votes in municipal elections. . . . Even where the use of property is
bizarre, unsuitable or obstreperous, it is not to be curtailed in the absence of overrid-
ing reasons of public policy."); Babcock, supra note 15, at 26 ("I trust some future
social historian will explain why the suburban mind, so bitterly opposed to collective
decisionmaking in matters of economics and social welfare, was the first to insist upon
collectivism in taste."). See also Hershman, Beauty as the Subject of Legislative Con-
trol, 15 PRAC. LAW. 20 (Feb. 1969) (the author suggests that the influence of the
Puritan ethic created a utilitarian sense of beauty allowing architectural restrictions);
Michelman, supra note 11, at 40 (the public remains apathetic to the government
establishing itself as an arbiter of taste).
141. See generally Dukeminier, supra note 50, at 236 (community officials should
interfere with the private use of property "only when the individual use seriously
hampers the achievement of community goals"); Michelman, supra note I1, at 39
(society has a special interest in the self-expression of its members).
142. See generally Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 94 (1973) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (a restriction of expression which is too broad may result in "the
suppression of a vast range of literary, scientific, and artistic masterpieces" in deroga-
tion of the First Amendment).
[Vol 16 273
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol16/iss1/7
